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THE UNWORKABILITY OF COURT-MADE
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: A REPLY
TO GEISTFELD
JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR.*
AARON D. TWERSKI**
In the Article to which Professor Geistfeld responds, we distinguish
between two types of products liability without defect: across-the-board
liability and product category liability.' Under the former, which most
scholars would describe as true "enterprise liability,"'2 all products manu-
facturers and distributors are held strictly liable for all the harms their
products cause regardless of whether the products are defective under
traditional tests for defect.3 Under the latter system, strict defect-free
liability would be imposed on a discrete and limited number of product
categories, most likely chosen on the basis of a societal risk-utility analy-
sis*4 We reject both forms of liability without defect for two reasons:
first, they would not be workable in court; second, even if workable, they
would generate destructive market distortions.5 Our concerns relating to
* Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B., 1959, Princeton Univcr-
sity; L.L.B., 1962, L.L.M., 1964, Harvard University.
** Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B., 1962, Beth Medrash Elyon Research
Institute; B.S., 1970, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; J.D., 1965, Marquette University.
I James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability
Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1263 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter, Closing the Frontier].
2 See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An
Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 129, 136 n.31 (1990) (defin-
ing enterprise liability); James A. Henderson, The Boundary Problems of Enterprise Liability,
41 Md. L. Rev. 659 n.1 (1982) (describing enterprise liability); George L. Priest, The Invention
of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modem Tort
Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461 (1985) (describing history and development of theory of enterprise
liability). Professor Geistfeld agrees: "At the most basic level, enterprise liability holds manu-
facturers liable for all injuries caused by their products." See Mark Geistfeld, Implementing
Enterprise Liability: A Comment on Henderson and Twerski, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1157, 1159
(1992).
3 See Closing the Frontier, supra note 1, at 1276. Professor Geistfeld agrees with our
definition: "[E]nterprise liability holds manufacturers liable for all injuries caused by their
products. As such, the full costs of such injuries are incorporated into the product's price."
See Geistfeld, supra note 2, at 1159.
4 See Closing the Frontier, supra note 1, at 1297. Good examples are cigarettes and alco-
holic beverages.
5 Under traditional rules governing liability for product designs, most of the harm caused
by product designs are borne by victims because most often they cannot show the designs to be
defective. Any scheme which moves all product-caused costs to product sellers would increase
product prices. As the prices of relatively risky new products rise, persons wishing to continue
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the unworkability of enterprise liability center around the inadequacy of
causation as a concept triggering liability. The shortcomings of causa-
tion as a focal point are particularly telling in connection with across-the-
board enterprise liability. Fault-or in the products liability context, de-
fect-is a major linchpin that holds tort law together. This is true be-
cause even causation cannot be determined coherently without reference
back to the nature of the underlying, fault-based entitlement.6 Stated
simply, actors are found to have caused harms that they have no legal
privilege to cause.7
Professor Geistfeld does not disagree with us in this regard. He sim-
ply finds sufficient guidance for judicial decision where we find none.
Two sources other than defect or fault combine, he asserts, to serve as
substitute linchpins: the social objective of promoting product safety, 8
and the limiting constraint of intended product use.9 His argument sug-
gests that distributors should be strictly liable for product-related harm
only when imposing liability would further the safety objective and when
such harm flows from intended product use. Our criticisms of his sug-
gestions are two-fold: first, if taken literally, this proposed alternative
appears to make no sense; second, even when generously reinterpreted,
Geistfeld's proposal reintroduces the very element of fault-namely, a
judicially imposed cost-benefit standard-which enterprise liability pur-
ports to render unnecessary.
Our Article employs an admittedly slapstick hypothetical to illus-
trate the difficulties that courts would encounter in attempting to deter-
mine causation in an across-the-board strict enterprise liability system
that has abandoned standards of reasonable care. After a heavy lunch of
pasta and several beers, a drowsy consumer slips on a roller skate, falls
down a flight of stairs, and winds up crashing his head through a TV
screen.10 Here is Professor Geistfeld's reaction to our hypothetical:
Recognizing [a] link between manufacturer liability and product safety
to use and consume risky products would turn to substitutes. Products manufactured and
distributed clandestinely would find new and expanding markets, undercutting existing com-
mercial markets. Durable products would be used much longer, increasing risks and further
undermining commercial markets. For some products, such as cigarettes and alcoholic bever-
ages, enterprise liability could well be the equivalent of a judicial ban on their commercial sale
and distribution. As such, the market distortions which may be induced by a scheme of enter-
prise liability are varied and far-reaching.
6 See Closing the Frontier, supra note 1, at 1281-82. Professor Geistfcld agrees. See
Geistfeld, supra note 2, at 1163 ("Courts... have defined the normative component of the
causation inquiry by reference to the policy considerations underlying the adoption of the
liability rule for the conduct in question.").
7 See Closing the Frontier, supra note 1, at n.72.
8 See Geistfeld, supra note 2, at 1164-65.
9 See id. at 1165-66.
10 See Closing the Frontier, supra note 1, at 1280-81.
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in turn provides the conceptual basis for limiting enterprise liability in
a principled fashion.
Consider the television manufacturer in Henderson and Twerski's
hypothetical. Do we want the screens on our TVs to be able to with-
stand the force of someone charging into them? ... It is critical to
understand that these are the incentives that manufacturers would face
if they were liable for such risks. Whether such incentives lead to de-
sirable outcomes depends upon the type of product safety that we are
seeking to achieve by adopting enterprise liability.
For example, if our objective is to have products that are opti-
mally safe when put to their intended use, then the risks for which a
manufacturer is strictly liable should only be those that arise when the
product is used as intended. An enterprise liability system based upon
such a safety objective accordingly would not make television manu-
facturers strictly liable for injuries that occur when people charge into
TVs or drop them on poodles.1
A number of fundamental disagreements between our position and
Professor Geistfeld's are readily apparent. Initially, we would suggest
that Geistfeld's technique of focusing on safety objectives offers little;
safety, as such, cannot serve as a normative baseline against which to
determine causation because it begs the question of how much safety. 12
Professor Geistfeld clearly does not mean to endorse a "maximum safety
regardless of cost" approach. Led by his concern for efficiency he parries
the question of "how much safety?" with the answer of "optimal
safety."1 3 Optimal safety means that in determining causation under a
particular set of facts in any given case, the court should render whatever
decision would yield optimal product safety. But how can a court decide
optimal safety without applying some sort of social risk-utility calculus-
either "fault," or "reasonableness," or "defect," or whatever one wishes
to call it? Professor Geistfeld actually appears to agree with us in this
regard:
A concept of product use that is derived from an objective based
on product safety thus provides a principled test for proximate cause
that limits manufacturer liability under enterprise liability .... The
legal inquiry takes the product as manufactured and includes no con-
sideration of whether the defendant-manufacturer should have acted
differently in making the product. Whether the manufacturer is liable
turns solely upon the issue of whether the plaintiff's injury was caused
by that product when used as intended. 14
1I Geistfeld, supra note 2, at 1164.
12 At several places early in his Essay, Professor Geistfeld appears to embrace safety, as
such, as his objective. See id. at 1160-61, 1164-65.
13 Id. at 1160.
14 Id. at 1164-65.
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By suggesting that courts apply a reasonableness filter in determin-
ing causation, Professor Geistfeld indicts the classic formulation of strict
enterprise liability, which attempts to internalize all product-caused acci-
dent costs and allows the market to determine optimality rather than
courts applying reasonableness tests such as risk-utility analysis. 15 By
suggesting that courts determine causation so as to achieve the objective
of optimal product safety, Professor Geistfeld reintroduces the linchpin
of reasonableness into his analysis of causation, bringing him full circle
to our position that a reasonableness standard is necessary.
Another way to understand the inadequacy of this approach to en-
terprise liability is to reconsider Professor Geistfeld's reaction to our TV
hypothetical. "Do we want the screens on our TVs to be able to with-
stand the force of someone charging into them?... [T]hese are the in-
centives that manufacturers would face if they were liable for such
risks." 16 Clearly Geistfeld would answer this question in the negative.
In sharp contrast, we would answer his question with, "We might, de-
pending on the circumstances."
Let us imagine that TV sets could come equipped with screens cov-
ering a wide range of relative shatterability. Imagine further that the TV
screen in our hypothetical is at the "very prone to shatter" end of the
spectrum. Is it as clear as Geistfeld suggests that an enterprise liability
system would not want the prices of TV sets to reflect this relative shat-
terability-and hence their riskiness-thus aiding consumers in choosing
optimally strong screens? The recurrent problem is coming up with a
substitute linchpin to replace "fault" or "defect," and while Professor
Geistfeld's proposal is not uniquely subject to this criticism, he is some-
what unique in denying so adamantly that it exists.
Professor Geistfeld's description of the incentives created by impos-
ing liability on TV manufacturers to build super-strong TV screens is
also misguided, and stems from an erroneous view of what enterprise
liability is intended to do.17 Enterprise liability is strict liability. How-
ever, at least in theory, moving from a negligence-based system such as
15 See note 3 and accompanying text supra. Having made the point that enterprise liability
will cause the costs of all injuries to be incorporated into the price of products, Professor
Geistfeld continues that-
Relatively riskier products thus sell for relatively higher prices. The need to keep prices
low in turn forces manufacturers to minimize product accident costs by making cost-
effective investments in product safety. Enterprise liability therefore assures that imper-
fectly informed consumers who purchase the lowest priced brand nevertheless buy the
brand that is optimally safe.
Geistfeld, supra note 2, at 1159.
16 Id. at 1164.
17 See id.
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that currently employed in the area of manufacturer's design liability 8 to
a system of strict liability such as enterprise liability should not affect
levels of design safety, but rather influence levels of product consump-
tion.19 Properly conceptualized, strict enterprise liability thus has a
"chips fall where they may" quality. Assuming that courts get their cau-
sation determinations correct, manufacturers would not redesign sets to
withstand the impact beyond the point of optimal TV screen strength.
By failing to acknowledge this dynamic, Professor Geistfeld's description
makes clear that subconsciously he is thinking about negligence when he
discusses judicial review of product designs under his "enterprise liabil-
ity" system. 20
The "intended use" element of Professor Geistfeld's substitute for
product defect is a familiar trap in the field of products liability law. Our
courts in fact rejected this notion decades ago, extending sellers' respon-
sibilities well beyond ensuring the product is "safe for intended use." In-
deed, in many states, if a product fails to perform its intended use, the
plaintiff need not even prove a specific defect in order to recover for her
injuries.21 The operative term in our present system is "reasonably fore-
seeable use" rather than "intended use.' '22 For if the use to which the
Is Although courts talk of imposing "strict liability" on manufacturers for defective de-
signs, in substance they are applying a negligence standard. See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365
N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1984) (noting underlying negligence calculus in risk-utility test); Sheila L.
Birbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict
Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 610 (1980) (noting role of negligence in strict
liability); see generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Products Liability:
Problems and Process, 609-12 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing basic precepts of strict liability).
19 See John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 323
(1973) (analyzing economic effects of liability rules).
20 Under negligence, it is never in the enterprise's interest to be negligent-for in theory
negligence is always cheaper to avoid than to incur.
21 The rule is commonly referred as that of "product malfunction." See Christopher H.
Hall, Annotation, Strict Products Liability: Product Malfunction or Occurrence of Accident
or Evidence of Defect, 65 A.L.R. 4th 346 (1988).
22 Early flirtations with the "intended use" doctrine as a governing standard for products
liability were short lived. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal,
1972) (holding that products must be safe not only for intended use but also for reasonably
foreseeable uses), modifying Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal.
1962) (holding that a product is defective if "unsafe for its intended use"); see also Findlay v.
Copeland Lumber Co., 509 P.2d 28, 31 (Or. 1973) (stating that "abnormal" use of product
which would bar plaintiff's recovery does not mean every instance of slight misuse, but instead
uses so unusual one could not reasonably expect product to be so used); Ritter v. Narragansett
Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255, 260 (R.I. 1971) (holding that the duty to give notice or warning of a
design danger encompasses not only intended uses but also foreseeable uses, even if such uses
are abnormal or unproven); see generally Dix W. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use,
Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 93, 95-107 (1972) (dis-
cussing how the defense of consumer's abnormal use requires determining whether such use
was foreseeable).
Liability for reasonably foreseeable product misuse is so widely recognized in the modem
era that citation to cases standing for that proposition would be endless. Indeed, it should be
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product is being put is reasonably foreseeable, and the manufacturer
could feasibly avoid accidents at socially acceptable costs, courts have
concluded that the manufacturer owes a duty to design the product in
such a way as to avoid those accidents. This approach is necessary if
products liability is to achieve the goal of optimizing product safety. In
this regard, it is not clear that Professor Geistfeld fully appreciates the
implications of his proposed "intended use" retrenchment. Nowhere, for
example, does he consider the externality problems associated with the
negative effects on bystanders of highly foreseeable and dangerous, but
admittedly unintended, product use.23
Of course, Professor Geistfeld hedges this difficulty by including
"reasonably foreseeable use" in his concept of "intended use." But the
notion of "reasonably foreseeable use" relies on risk-utility notions of the
sort imbedded in "fault" and "defect." Professor Geistfeld is thus stuck
between something of a rock and a you-know-what. If he moves to rea-
sonably foreseeable use, he reneges on enterprise liability's promise to
avoid in-court risk-utility analysis. If he sticks with intended use, he sets
our products liability system back to the Stone Age. While "intended
use" may permit him to break intellectually from relying on objective
principles of reasonableness, he cannot mean to suggest that we could
actually live with the substantive implications of his proposed solution.24
Another problem with intended use as a substitute for defect is de-
termining what is or is not an "intended use." We spoke earlier of Pro-
fessor Geistfeld's rejection of a "shatterable TV screen" claim, on the
grounds that collisions were not a use intended by the distributor.25 But
if the plaintiff in our TV hypothetical had been watching TV and was
recognized that most product litigation today involves what can only be characterized as non-
intended use situations. For the most part, in cases where products fail within their intended
use, liability is easily established and rarely needs to be litigated. See J. Henderson & A.
Twerski, supra note 18, at 22-23.
It is when products are tested at their design limits that accidents occur. In these cases it
becomes necessary to establish a test for defect which asks not only what is the frequency of
the foreseeable misuse and what are the envisaged consequences but also whether the costs of
designing against such misuse is both technologically and economically feasible. This, of
course, calls for risk-utility balancing.
23 However, all of Professor Geistfeld's illustrations involve plaintiffs who used a product
which injured them.
24 Professor Geistfeld appears to appreciate the difficulties connected with intended use. In
his text, he states, "The current products liability system has of course rqjected an intended-use
test for one of 'reasonably foreseeable use,' and it does seem more desirable to force manufac-
turers to make product-safety decisions by reference to reasonably foreseeable use rather than
intended use." Geistfeld, supra note 2, at 1165 (footnote omitted). But we are at a loss to
understand how, having made such a concession, he can continue to insist that such a modi-
fied, reasonableness-based approach to causation constitutes true enterprise liability. See note
3 and accompanying text supra.
25 See Geistfeld, supra note 2, at 1164.
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pushed into the screen by a playful dog, would not the TV have been put
to its intended use? What if the plaintiff had been listening to the TV
while walking down the stairs, instead of reading a book? Would the
plaintiff in that case recover? We see no easy answers to these questions
under Professor Geistfeld's approach, for he appears to reject imposing
"breakable glass" costs on the TV manufacturer under any
circumstance.26
Another example may be useful. Consider a driver who runs his car
into another car and suffers so-called "second collision" injuries from
being thrown against an unyielding dashboard. If Professor Geistfeld is
to remain consistent with his earlier application of intended use analysis
in the TV set hypothetical, he must categorically deny a claim arising
from an automobile second collision. After all, car collisions are no more
intended than TV collisions. Yet nearly every American jurisdiction has
recognized second-collision crashworthiness claims for many years. 27
Even if Geistfeld were to argue that some types of collisions were foresee-
able and should be included within the category of "intended use," he
would soon face the problem of deciding which collisions to include and
which to exclude. Are collisions at 60 m.p.h., 70 m.p.h., 80 m.p.h., etc.
within the ambit of "intended use?" We do not believe a court should
accept self-serving testimony by a manufacturer's employees regarding
their subjective intent; an objective test would instead appear to be neces-
sary. Ultimately, Geistfeld would have to develop a governing principle
to define the category of intended use, and this would inevitably bring
him back to optimum safety which would require judicial application of
a cost-benefit reasonableness standard. 28
One final point which Professor Geistfeld makes is worth comment.
He argues at several places that the proximate cause inquiry has been
manageable historically in connection with strict liability for ul-
trahazardous activities, and that this analogue illustrates the workability
of a scheme of strict liability without product defect.29 Proximate cause
26 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
27 For a recent listing of the states which have adopted the crashworthiness doctrine, see
Barry Levenstam & Daryl J. Lapp, Plaintiff's Burden of Proving Enhanced Injury in
Crashworthiness Cases: A Clash Worthy of Analysis, 38 DePaul L. Rev. 55, 61 n.33 (1988).
The authors list only two states that at the time of the writing refused to allow recovery for
injuries caused by the manufacturer's failure to reasonably design a car in a way such that it
would minimize injuries in the event of a collision. Id. at 61 n.31. More recently in Blanken-
ship v. General Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 782 (W. Va. 1991) the court noted that the two
holdout states, Mississippi and West Virginia, would allow a crashworthiness action. The
rules have thus, for all practical purposes, become unanimous.
28 We would introduce reasonableness in the test for defective design; Geistfeld introduces
it in the test for causation. But either way, a system which employs concepts of reasonableness
is not "enterprise liability".
29 See Geistfeld, supra note 2, at 1163.
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is certainly more manageable in the context of ultrahazardous activity,
but this is because the criteria traditionally relied upon to identify which
activities are ultrahazardous involve determinations of aggregate social
risk-utility only slightly less finely tuned than the marginal risk-utility
test associated with traditional negligence and defect-based liability.30
From our analytical perspective, when Professor Geistfeld moves to
his ultrahazardous activity analysis, he moves from across-the-board lia-
bility without defect to categorical liability without defect. His analogy
may to some extent be apt in connection with the latter, because risk-
utility criteria are used to identify the product categories appropriate for
liability. However, it completely misses the mark in connection with the
former. Across-the-board strict liability-which is what most scholars
have in mind when they employ the term "enterprise liability"-involves
no linchpin criteria whatever other than causation unguided by fault for
deciding which products distributors are to be held liable. All product
distributors are liable for all of the harms their products cause. 31
Indeed, we make precisely this point in the Article to which Profes-
sor Geistfeld responds. At the outset of the discussion concerning imple-
mentation problems associated with categorical liability, we observe:
Recall that adoption of across-the-board strict liability, by eliminating
the requirement of defect, would create significant problems for courts
trying to resolve issues of contributory fault, useful product life, and
causation. The elimination of the linchpin element of defectiveness
would eliminate the baseline framework upon which intelligent analy-
sis and resolution of these issues rest. Product-category liability, by
retaining at least the categorical judgment of reasonableness if not the
marginal judgment of defectiveness, would appear to supply at least
some of the analytical framework missing in across-the-board liability
without defect. For example, with respect to plaintiff's contributory
fault, the unreasonableness of the product category could be balanced
more easily against the unreasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct.3 2
Does this mean that Professor Geistfeld's ultrahazardous activity
analogy can solve the workability problems associated with what we term
"product category liability"? Having admitted above that categorical lia-
bility is less daunting than across-the-board enterprise liability, we never-
theless noted that:
First appearances, however, are likely to be deceiving. Having con-
cluded that the product in question should never have been distributed
30 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977). The criteria include the existence of a
high degree of risk, the likelihood that the harm will be great, and the extent to which the
activity's value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. Id.
31 See note 3 supra (citing Geistfeld, supra note 2, at 1159).
32 Closing the Frontier, supra note 1, at 1301 (citations omitted).
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in the first instance, some courts might be tempted to conclude that
plaintiff's fault should play no role at all. Their reasoning would be
that if the product had never been distributed, it could not have been
the object of plaintiff's foolish, risky behavior. But eliminating plain-
tiff's fault is viewed by most courts and commentators as unwise.
For courts that sensibly decided to retain contributory fault, the
tasks of assessing that fault and deciding when to count it against the
plaintiff would be much more difficult than under traditional defect-
based approaches to liability. The source of the difficulty inheres in the
difference between a categorical versus marginal approach to product
design. Under the traditional, marginal approach, the court under-
takes a careful and precise evaluation of the particular design's reason-
ableness compared with feasible design alternatives. If adding a
slightly different safety feature would have saved-and thus "for-
given"-the plaintiff's foolish inadvertence, then probably the plain-
tiff's foolishness should not count for much. But when the entire
product category is condemned on risk-utility grounds and the court
decides that it should not forgive, for that reason alone, all of the plain-
tiff's foolishness, the remaining question of "how much foolishness
should this particular design forgive?" is begged rather than answered
meaningfully by the categorical judgment of unreasonableness. 33
We raised similar points regarding useful safe life and proximate causa-
tion in our Article, and concluded that narrowing the focus from across-
the-board to discrete product categories would eliminate some, but not
all, of the associated difficulties.34
In sum, we have suggested that across-the-board strict enterprise lia-
bility would be unworkable. This conclusion stems from our belief that
numerous issues-chief among them causation-could not be worked
out coherently once the linchpin of underlying entitlement-here, "de-
fect"-is eliminated. Professor Geistfeld, in his response, suggests two
substitute linchpins: first, the goal of optimal product safety, and second,
intended product use. As we have shown, when he relies on the objective
of optimal safety to allow courts to reach coherent judgments regarding
causation, he reintroduces social risk utility into his test for liability, al-
beit under the heading of "causation" rather than "defect." Traditional
conceptions of enterprise liability build from the understanding that the
market should determine optimal product safety levels rather than the
courts. It should thus be clear by now that to make any sense of causa-
tion, Geistfeld has abandoned enterprise liability. His second substitute
linchpin-that distributors are liable only when their products are being
put to the uses intended by the distributors-would set back our liability
system to the pre-§ 402(A) era. Even rendering the standard more sensi-
33 Id. at 1301-02 (citations omitted).
34 See id. at 1302.
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ble by substituting "reasonably foreseeable uses" for "intended uses,"
Professor Geistfeld slips back into the habit of letting risk-utility enter
the analysis through the back door.
That leaves Professor Geistfeld with his analogy to ultrahazardous
activities. But even granting the point, it must be recognized that the
analogy bolsters only what we call category liability and not across-the-
board enterprise liability. Because across-the-board is what most schol-
ars have in mind when they speak of "enterprise liability," his analogy is
of quite limited value in this setting.
Finally, throughout this reply, we have spoken of his advocating an
alternative approach to enterprise liability. He expressed his own rea-
sons for doubting the advisability of such a system, chief of which were
the high transaction costs an enterprise liability system would generate 3 5
As such, his main disagreement with us is a narrow one relating to our
assertion that enterprise liability could not work, not that it should not
work.36 His task was to demonstrate the inadequacy of our conclusion
that court-made enterprise liability is inherently unworkable. An essen-
tial step in this endeavor requires proof that an alternative approach-
here, one relying on optimal product safety and intended use-is worka-
ble. To the extent he fails to demonstrate a workable alternative scheme
of enterprise liability-one which operates without court-applied cost-
benefit analysis---our initial condemnation of enterprise liability remains
unchallenged.
35 See Geistfeld, supra note 2, at 1171-72.
36 See id. at 1173.
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